Social psychology, demographic variables, and linear regression: Breaking the iron triangle in voting research by Achen, Christopher H.
Political Behavior, Vol. 14, No..3, 1992 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, DEMOGRAPHIC 
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Breaking the Iron Triangle in 
Voting Research 
Christopher H. Achen 
A previous paper showed that a simple prospective model of voting and party identifica- 
tion subsumed much of the social-psychological and retrospective voting literatures, in the 
sense that it rigorously implied their key findings and added many new ones as well, This 
paper extends the argument by showing that the same prospective voting model has dras- 
tic implications for conventional statistical specifications in voting research. First, linear 
models should be discarded in favor of a particular nonlinear specification. Second, dem- 
ographics should be dropped from the list of independent variables. 
in political science, quantitative researchers enjoyed their first and most 
enduring success in voting studies. After the invention of survey research, 
empirical generalizations poured fbrth: in no other field do we have so 
many hard facts with which to discipline our thinking. In most American 
presidential years, for example, we can forecast the aggregate national vote 
with astonishing accuracy several months in advance (e.g., Rosenstone, 
1983). We know which issue positions are best predicted by income, which 
by education, and which by race or religion, and we know how" these cor- 
relations have changed over time. There is a rapidly growing body of com- 
parative international data as well; properly measured, many of the con- 
cepts developed in America fit other nations as well (Johnston, 1988). 
Factual disagreement within the field is very modest  by social science 
standards: Good data make for consensus. 
Statistical methods have undergirded the achievements of opinion re- 
search. Indeed, linear regression and its extensions have so dominated the 
journals that they became identified with "good work." For many years, 
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voting research had an almost formulaic character: In a national survey 
sample, the vote was expressed as a simple additive funciton of party iden- 
tification (PID), issues, and demographics. Regression might be replaced 
by probit or two-stage least squares, but the underlying linear framework 
of part), ID, issues, and demographics was almost never questioned. 
The statistical practices of voting researchers were driven by the social- 
psychological thinking that initially captured the field. Group identification 
was said to structure individuals' thinking, and the stronger the identifica- 
tion, the stronger the effect. Essentially, being the child of Democrats led 
to being a Democrat oneself, and being a Democrat ted to liberalism (Camp- 
bell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1980, chapters 6 and 7). Exogenous 
changes in group membership, such as geographic relocation or divorce, 
might alter party ID, but opinion changes were not likely to do so (Camp- 
bell et al., 1980, pp. 146-150). Hence it was sensible to treat party ID as 
exogenous, and to "explain" the vote as a function of it, along with demo- 
graphics and issues as controls for group loyalties and short-term forces. 
Such a framework is clear enough, perhaps, but it is less than adequate 
in the face of changing political realities. Group loyalties are largely stable, 
but in actual elections the effects of party ID, group identifications, and 
contemporary issues wax and wane. How are these changes to be ac- 
counted for? When and why does party identification change over time? 
How does it interact with issues? When might one or the other dominate 
the vote? How precisely do voters compromise among many different 
group influences? How do these decisions vary with the political life histo- 
ries of the voter and the nation? For all too many of these questions, social 
psychology had no answers. 
The central difficulty is that the causal connections subtly intertwine. If 
we understood them, powerful explanatory devices would lie in our hands. 
At minimum, some rough sense of their interaction is critical to carrying 
out dependable empirical work. But the interconnections were left un- 
specified by the social-psychological framework bequeathed to voting re- 
search. In that tradition, every causal impact was investigated separately, 
as if the systemic whole did not exist. Not surprisingly, in spite of sustained 
effort by many researchers and a considerable body of discrete experimen- 
tal discoveries, little theoretical integration occurred, (Important excep- 
tions include Jackson, 1975; Franklin and Jackson, 1983; and Brady and 
Sniderman, 1985.) 
In this intellectual climate, nearly all researchers defaulted to the sim- 
plest possible statistical specification: "ordinary" linear regression (i.e., lin- 
earity with an assumed constant causal effect for each independent vari- 
able). Thus, the statistical models assumed what everyone knew to be false, 
namely that each causal effect operated independently of the values of' the 
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other variables. Researchers studying the vote knew that campaign stimuli 
influenced Independents more strongly than party identifiers, so that cam- 
paign effects are not linear, but they used linear regression models with 
fixed effects anyway. Researchers studying party ID knew that experienced 
voters had more stable PIDs, so that lagged PID effects are not linear, but 
they used linear regression models with fixed effects anyway. Researchers 
studying vote defection from party ID knew that the best-informed and 
the worst-informed voters were more faithful to their party ID than the 
middling-informed, so that information effects are not linear, but they used 
linear regression models with fixed effects anyway. 
Tile benefits of linear empiricism are not negligible, especially when 
compared to no empiricism at all, but they are soon exhausted. In voting 
studies, the point of diminishing returns arrived perhaps a decade ago. 
After the many discoveries and successes of the sixties and seventies, no 
one any longer expects that the next election will bring new findings about 
anything but itself. Too many regressions have already been run. 
This disappointing sequence of events recurs across the discipline (and 
outside it as well). As Charles Ragin (1989) notes, quantitative social scien- 
tists are obsessed with ordinary linear regression equations, in which the 
marginal effect of every independent variable is forever fixed and their 
joint impact is simplistically additive. The actual social world, he says, is 
quite different. There effects are "contextual" (nonlinear in each variable) 
and "holistic" (interactive): The marginal impact of a variable depends both 
on its own value and on that of other causal factors. Forcing an oversim- 
plified linear model on the data benefits us little, Ragin says, and in field 
after field, the Procrustean methods of much "large N" research account for 
their wattery findings and feeble theoretical impacts. 
Ragin's arguments are very familiar, indeed nearly cliches. Moreover, 
statistical methods for interactive nonlinear specifications have long been 
known. Yet Ragin is surely right when he argues that, just as in the voting 
field, in practice nearly all social scientific statistical specifications are 
garden-variety linear-in-variable models. ~ One might add that Ragin's point 
is just as true of probit and logit, selection bias models, time series applica- 
tions, their multiequation extensions, and other developments of the last 
two decades: The higher-powered methods and more intensive computing 
add little when applied to unsophisticated linear-in-variable specifications. 
For all its factual contributions, linear empiricism bears a certain share of 
the blame for the modest contribution of voting research to contemporary 
political theorizing. The numbing repetition of the same statistical specifi- 
cations has discouraged theoretical speculation and driven lively minds to 
more topical matters. Thus, every election brings forth a new round of 
studies: Why did Candidate X win? Which issues were influential? How 
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much difference did the economy make? Did the campaign matter? How" 
was the party ID balance affected? Such questions are not uninteresting, of 
course, and their great advantage is that they are descriptive ibatures of a 
single election and therefore can be studied within the confines of a na- 
tional probability cross-section. Their great disadvantage is that they are of 
limited theoretical interest and must be answered all over again as soon as 
the next election rolls around. The journalistic nature of the enterprise 
escapes no one for long, and malaise soon sets in. 
Like many before it, this paper proposes the obvious alternative, that 
theory be taken seriously. That bromide turns out to have real meaning in 
this context. Indeed, it has radical consequences for the day-to-day working 
habits of opinion researchers. 
As an illustration, this paper specifies a very simple but powerthl model 
of voter behavior, namely rational voting with incomplete information. 
Then statistical specifications for explaining party ID and the vote are de- 
rived from the model. 
Drastic conclusions follow. First, Ragin is right: Linear regression and 
probit models are misspecified and should be ignored. In particular, voter 
information is theoretically critical, and without particular nonlinear con- 
trols for it, no statistical estimates of vote or party ID equations should be 
trusted. 
Second, when researchers are being theoretically serious, demographics 
should be discarded. They belong neither in party ID nor in vote equa- 
tions. The voter's political history is the only causal variable. Age, social 
class, and other background factors will be correlated with history, of 
course; they may provide a serviceable summary for purely descriptive 
purposes. But they do not belong in explanatory equations. 
The next section sets out the intuitions behind the argument. The follow- 
ing sections outline the model, list the conclusions that follow from it, and 
explain how econometric work may be done within its structure. 
SUBSTANTIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
The model in this paper rests on three principle substantive assump- 
tions: 
1. The voters are ratiohal. This postulate means that voters do not ignore 
the information they have, do not fabricate information they do not have, 
and do not choose what they do not want. Thus, the voters need be neither 
geniuses nor saints. They are required only to do their best with the infor- 
mation they have. It suffices, for example, that they take the advice of 
better-informed friends or groups. 
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Obvious as it sounds, the rationality assumption contrasts sharply with 
other perspectives on voting. For example, the w)ters in the social-psycho- 
logical tradition tend to follow the party identification of" their parents, 
whether it makes sense {br them or not. And they may imagine that the 
candidate of their party is closer to them than is actually the ease, simply to 
make themselves feel better by reducing cognitive dissonance. In the ra- 
tional choice tradition, such behavior is explained as the inevitable sam- 
pling errors stemming from reasonable inferential rules. 
2. The voters are prospective in orientation. This postulate also contrasts 
with other familiar viewpoints, including some occasionally mistaken for 
rational choice models. "Retrospective voters," for example, choose at least 
partly on the basis of the past, even though they cannot hope to change it 
and its lessons may have long ceased to be relevant. For the rational voter, 
however, bygones are bygones, and only the future matters. Thus, retro- 
spective voting is not a rational choice theory. As standard decision theory 
teaches, the rational chooser looks forward, not backward. The rational 
voter is a prospective voter, and the past is useful only for its clues about 
the future. (Recent evidence for prosepetive voting includes Lewis-Beck, 
1988, and Loekerbie, 1989.) 
3. There are just  two parties and they each offer benefits to voters that 
oscillate over time around a fixed but unknown mean. Unlike the first two 
assumptions, which would obtain in any model of this kind, this third one 
specializes the model to a simple ease for ease of analysis--.-a stable two- 
party system. For each voter, the parties offer benefits, sometimes rather 
more, sometimes rather less. The benefits vary. independently from one 
term of office to the next around a central tendency. Thus, the parties may 
oscillate left or right by chance, but they do not drift steadily in any one 
direction. In effect, the model describes a stable period between realign- 
ments. 
Within the overall framework, one might analyze voter behavior under 
quite different assumptions, for example, that the parties trend over time, 
undergo realignments, and so on, The arguments would be quite similar. 
But for present purposes, the fixed mean and independent sampling as- 
sumptions are maintained. 
In this setup, only the true mean benefit is of interest to the voter. She 
wishes to forecast {hture benefits so that she can vote intelligently, and 
party benefits are drawn independently over time from a common distribu- 
tion, Hence to predict benefits to come, she can do no better than to fore- 
east the mean. Since that mean is unknown, however, she must use her 
past experience with the parties to estimate it. Under the simplified model 
of this paper, all past benefits are a random sample from a common distri- 
200 ACHEN 
bution. Hence from elementary statistics, the stylized rational voter knows 
that a simple average of past benefits is the best estimate. It is convenient 
to think of her as computing this average as each term of office ends. 
For voters with a good deal of experience, that ends the story. A new 
voter, however, has no such past experience, and a young voter may have 
very little. Such voters will not wish to place too much emphasis on the 
current campaign or the most recent president, since their information is 
so noisy. Hence they will bring a "prior distribution" to bear: beliefs about 
the parties that predate the voter's initial entry into the political system. 
The most likely source tbr these beliefs is their parents. 
If parents and children tend to occupy similar social positions, and if 
party benefits are related to social positions, then it is rational to use paren- 
tal party ID to help form one's own party ID. One will not hold the ID as 
strongly as the parents, because one's own life will not be identical with 
theirs. But the voter makes fewer mistakes, especially in the early years, 
by using parental ID as a stm'ting point. Over time, as will be seen below, 
parental influence wanes as political life experience accumulates. 
This model, then, falls into the voting research tradition begun by Key 
(1966), who argued that elections constitute evaluations of incumbent per- 
formance, especially of the economy (see also Downs, 1957). For Key, 
party identification was a rational choice, a "standing decision" subject to 
modification with further experience ~aekson, 1975; Fiorina, 1981). Ra- 
tional-choice theorizing along these lines includes models of individual vot- 
ers by Zechman (1979), who studied single-election campaign dynmnics, 
and by Calvert and MaeKuen (1985), who treat dynamics across realign- 
ments. By contrast, this paper and its predecessor study voter dynamics 
across  elections and w i t h i n  realignments. This focus leads more easily to 
macro-level results, such as the dynamics of the party distribution over 
time. It also matches up more simply with the available data, which consist 
primarily of single-election cross-sections within a party alignment system. 
In consequence, many more analytic results are possible than with prior 
approaches, most of them verifiable with existing data. 
THE MODEL 
We now set out the model more precisely. First, note that in a two-party 
system only the difference in benefits between the parties is relevant to the 
voter's decision. As noted above, the model specifies that voter i's party 
difference in benefits at any given time t, denoted by ul,, varies randomly 
around its mean: 
Uit = ~i @ I)it (1) 
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where 8i is the voter's mean or long-term benefit differential and vi~ is the 
deviation from the mean at a particular time t. It is assmed that v~t has 
mean zero and finite variance oJ~ > 0, and that it is distributed independ- 
ently over time. 
We also assume that across the population the true distribution of party 
benefits is normal. Any distribution could be used as a test case; the normal 
is analytically convenient. Since the scale of party benefits is arbitrary (up 
to an afline transformation), we take the distribution to be standard normal. ~ 
Thus, writing f(8i) for the density over the population, and N(/x, (r "9) for the 
density of a normal distribution with :mean/x and variance o'2: 
y~g~) = N(0, 1) (2) 
At time 0, the voter enters the political system. She has no direct knowl- 
edge of 8i, her benefit difference between the parties. However, she has a 
prior belief about it, derived from parental experience. It was shown in 
Aehen (1989) how such a distribution may be derived. In effect, children 
compromise between their parents' PID and the population average--a  
form of regression to the mean. The more social mobility in the soeiety, the 
less relevant parental experience is likely to be, and hence the more the 
children will discount it. Similarly, erratic benefit streams during the par- 
ents' lifetimes also lead to their children discounting parental experience. 
In all eases, the children are assumed to behave as sensible Bayesians, and 
the voter's initial PID turns out to be a linear function of her parents' PID. 
As succeeding periods pass, the voter gets experience with the parties. 
She receives one observation per period from equation (1), each independ- 
ently distributed, a She uses this information to optimally update her be- 
liefs, converging toward the "'right" PID (el. Franklin, 1984, p. 474). 
The relevant Bayesian theorem is the following: 
Theorem. Suppose the scalar random variable x is distributed N(/~, o "~) 
and that n independent realizations xl, x2 . . . . .  x,, are observed. Denote 
the sample mean of the xi by 2,,. If tx has a prior distribution N(/~o, o'(~), and 
if o "z is known, then the posterior distribution is N(/x,,, o-,,2), where: 
hotxo + hfi,, ~,, - ( ,3)  
ho + ht 
with "precisions" ho = 1/o'2o and hi = n/o "~, and where, setting h. = l/o-.~z: 
h, = ho + ht (4) 
This theorem applies to the voter in the following way. At time 0 voter i 
has a prior belief about her party benefit differential, derived from her 
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2 After n pe- parents, normally distributed with mean 81o and variance trio. 
riods, she also has experience with the parties (her likelihood), summarized 
by the mean value of her benefit streams, tii~ with variance oaZi/n. Applying 
the theorem produces the voter's current benefit estimate, namely ~, ,  
along with its posterior variance: 
gi~ = hiogio + hiN~n (5) 
h~o + hi~ 
where as above h~o = 1/~o, h~t = n/(to~), f~i~ = E'~= 1 uiJn and the preci- 
sion of current PID is hi,~ = hlo + hit. 
This equation (5) defines the "'current party identification" of voter i: It is 
her current estimate of the benefit difl~erential between the parties, namely 
gin. This quantity is an estimate of the underlying true value, gi, which is 
called the "long-term party identification." These definitions suggest how 
one might integrate the older notion that a voter has a stable PID that 
generates a "'normal vote" with the newer perspective that she also has a 
PID that she continually revises as the political life of her country evolves. 
Equation (5) has a "retrospeetive" form: The voter estimates current PID 
A 
from a weighted average of parental PID (captured in her initial PID, ~io) 
and her political experience (summarized by bin)? But the logic is rig- 
orously prospective: Both parents and personal history are useful just to the 
extent that they prediet the future, and not otherwise. In fact, the retro- 
spective appearance is an accident of the special case considered here, in 
which party benefit streams are constant over time. If the model were 
applied to the period of a realignment or to parties whose platforms and 
appeals are changing, it would eease to be retrospective. 
The elements of equation (5) vary across individuals and ordinarily can- 
not be measured directly. For example, the voter may well be uncertain 
about the mean party benefit she has experienced over her lifetime. Thus, 
in practice, it nmst be expressed as a function of other measures, and the 
result should be substituted into equation (5). Typically, several such sub- 
stitutions will be neeessary so that unknown parameters will appear in both 
numerator and denominator. In addition, all the measures in use will be 
noisy variables derived from surveys. The resulting nonlinear expression 
will behave during estimation like a sensitive and overwrought child under 
disciplinary interrogation. Not nmeh good sense will ensue, and the wise 
will avoid the task entirely. ~ A better approach is to use prior PID to incor- 
porate parental effects, and then to express current PID as a function of 
partisanship at the prior period plus the most recent retrospection. From 
equation (5), we have that the voter's PID at the previous period was: 
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A 
" hio~io + hil'Ui,n I 
~i,n--1 
h~o + h~t, 
(6) 
where hio = 1/o-2 as before, ha, = (n - 1)/(m~), fi+,,-t 
and hi , , , -1  = h~o + hiz,. 
Substitution into equation (5) yields: 
= Z t 2 i  ~ u i j (n  - 1) 
A 
A 8in = hi , , , -  181,n- ~ + h,oiui,, 
h~,n_, + h~ (7) 
where h~i = I/cop is the inverse of the sampling variance of the nth obser- 
vation. 
This equation expresses party ID as a function of retrospective benefits 
since the last period plus PID at that period. It is far more manageable 
than equation (5), since its elements are more easily measured. Even with 
good measures, however, nonlinear estimation of Bayesian models has 
proved difficult in practice; few examples are in print. As Bartels (1991) 
notes, these models are nearly unidentified. In equation (3), if Cro 2 
and 2 are approximately proportional across the population, meaning that 
voters' initial variance in their benefit estimates is proportional to the vari- 
ance in perceived benefits during their life (which would occur under the 
model if parents tend to have approximately the same perceived variation 
in benefits as their children), then the weights are also proportional. Hence 
numerator and denominator have a common factor of o "2, and the latter 
parameter is not identified. 
Under the proportionality assmnption, multiplying numerator and de- 
nominator in equation (7) by COl 2 cures the unidentifiability. Entering pa- 
rameters for scale differences among variables and assuming that each vari- 
able's zero point corresponds to Independence, we then have an 
approximate PID equation of the form: 
[ ~ I ( / I E )  -I- ([~2 q- ~an)(PID_a) 
PID = (8) 
c t q - n  
where PID_ 1 is the lagged value of PID, R E  is the retrospective evaluation 
tbr the past term of office (which might consist of several variables, each 
with its own eoeffieient), and n is the number of terms experienced by the 
voter. ~ This is a mildly nonlinear equation, easily estimable with contempo- 
rary software. It is the basic statistical specification for party identification 
that follows from the model of this paper.7 
Finally, it is assumed that in the course of a campaign, the voter gets 
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some additional information ci,.+ 1 beyond her prior party ID about what ui, n+ 1 
is likely to be in the next period: 
Ci.n+ 1 ~- Ui.n+ 1 -t- El .n+ 1 (9) 
where ei,.+ 1 is normally distributed with mean zero and variance "t/z. The 
term 1H/z will be denoted by hi.. 
Combining current PID plus campaign information, voter i estimates 
benefits in the next period (ui,.+l) as: 
h i c g i ,  q- hi.rCn + 1 
fii,.+l = hi¢ + hi. (10) 
where hic is the inverse of the sum of the posterior variance of current PID 
plus o /2. 
Hence the voter chooses the first party if its expected benefits exceed 
those of the second party, that is, if: 
ill,.+1 > 0 (11) 
This equation may be estimated by nonlinear probit analysis under the 
assumption that omitted variables are normally distributed with mean zero 
and the same variance for the population. The right-hand side of the probit 
equation is that of equation (8), with an additional term in the numerator 
for current issues. Adding intercepts to capture the means of unmeasured 
effects yields: 
oq + f51(RE ) + ~z(I) + (f33 + 134n)(PID_ 1) 
e¢o + (12) 
e¢3+ n 
where all variables are defined as before and I is the set of variables meas- 
uring current campaign issues. 
It is important to note that both equation (8) for PID and equation (12) 
for the vote are functions of party identification at the prior period. The 
current party identification recorded in the midst of the campaign incorpo- 
rates retrospective evaluations; it is a consequence of this model that, with 
sufficiently good measurement, retrospections should drop out when cur- 
rent PID is used to predict the vote. 
VALIDATING THE MODEL 
The model has now been set out. Like any other new perspective, its 
value is best assessed by establishing its fit with what we already know. 
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Eleven propositions follow rigorously and straightforwardly from its as- 
sumptions (Achen, 1989). Here we simply list them, along with references 
to the empirical literature where the effect has been verified: 
Proposition 1. New voters' current PIDs are initially positively corre- 
lated with that of their parents but are more centrist (Jennings and Niemi, 
1981, pp. 90-91, 153). 
Proposition 2. New voters' current PIDs are initially more labile (higher 
subjective variance of estimate) than their parents (Jennings and Niemi, 
1981, pp. 50-51). 
Proposition 3. New voters with more labile parents have more labile 
PIDs; they will also have more centrist PIDs than other new voters whose 
parents have the same mean experience with the parties (Jennings and 
Niemi, 1981, pp. 50-5t,  86-87). 
Proposition 4. The effect of parental PID on children's current PIDs is 
positive, but it declines over time at a diminishing rate (Jennings and 
Niemi, 1981, p. 90; this result was also derived by Calvert and MaeKuen, 
1985). 
Proposition 5. Relative to the impact of parental PID, the effect of total 
life experience on voters' current PIDs is positive and increases with time. 
Proposition 6. The effect of lagged PID on current PID increases with 
time; relative to lagged PID, the effect of current benefits diminishes with 
time (Markus, 1979; Franklin and Jackson, 1983)Y 
Thus, the young moved disproportionately toward the party of successful 
incumbents in the 1930s (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1980 
[1960], pp. 153-157) and the I980s. Moreover, the adjustment in party 
identification occurs at the end of the first term. Thus, major changes to- 
ward the Democrats should occur in 1,936 rather than in 1932 (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1980 [1960], pp, 534-535) and toward the 
Republicans in 1984 but not in 1980 or 1982. 
Proposition 7. (Key's standing decision model). Party identification 
changes only when benefits in the current period are unexpectedly high or 
low relative to the last period's current PID; the effect of the innovations 
diminishes over time (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, 1989). 
Proposition 8. If all voters have the same posterior variance in initial PID 
and in benefit estimates, if the intraperiod voter benefit levels are not neg- 
atively correlated, and if the mean voter is a nonpartisan, then partisanship 
grows with time (Converse, 1969; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 
1980 [1960]:162-163). 1° 
Proposition 9. Assume the conditions of Proposition 8, but let informa- 
tion about party benefits (wi) vary across the population independently of 
mean benefits (gi). Then on average partisans are better informed about 
their party benefits than nonpartisans (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes, 1980 [1960], pp. 142-145). 
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Proposition I0. If two voters have the same posterior variance fbr current 
PID and the same variance in campaign information, then the more Inde- 
pendent of the two will respond more strongly to campaign information 
(Converse, 1966b). 
Finally, one may also derive the well-known curvilinear relation between 
campaign information and defection from party- ID: 
Proposition 11. Controlled for current PID, its posterior variance, and 
the over-time variance of party benefit differential, the probability of defec- 
tion is lower at high and low levels of information and is highest at inter- 
mediate levels (Converse, 1966c; see also Geddes and Zaller, 1989; Zaller, 
1989). 
In summary, then, the simple model proposed here subsumes within a 
unified framework a broad range of findings in the literature. When the 
model is used to structure statistical work, there is no need to worry each 
time about whether a specification for changes in party identification, let us 
say, is consistent with what we know about low-information voters, Inde- 
pendents, and retrospective voters. The model automatically applies the 
findings of prior work and avoids theoretical inconsistencies. The price, 
however, is a radical redirection of conventional work habits, as the next 
seetion demonstrates. 
EC:ONOMETRIC: QONSEQUENQES FOR PARTY ID EQUATIONS 
Theoretical clarity has dramatic repercussions in empirical voting re- 
search. While many of these have been noted above, and the rest are im- 
plicit in the equations derived, it may be useful to spell out the conse- 
quences individually. This section begins with the equations that explain 
party identification. 
1. Demographics do not appear in theoretical equations explaining party 
ID or the vote. This proposition states what is obvious t?om inspection of 
equations (8) and (12). PID and votes are explained by beliefs about the 
future, and those beliefs are formed from parental socialization, political 
experience with the parties, and current campaign issues. Occupying a par- 
ticular social niche may help us guess the voter's experiences and beliefs, 
but they are not themselves explanatory (Franklin, 1984, p. 467). 
In practice, of course, measuring beliefs is difficult. Errors of measure- 
ment abound, and complex econometric methods often must be employed 
to correct for them. If demographics predict beliefs but have no causal 
impact themselves, then they meet certain of the criteria to be "instrumen- 
tal variables," variables that can be used to "purge" noisy measures of their 
errors. Thus, demographics can be useful and may sometimes even be es- 
sential. But for theoretical purposes, they are just a tool, and their eoeffi- 
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eients in auxiliary purging regressions are of no interest. They do not be- 
long in the main explanatory equation. Only if no measures of the theo- 
retically relevant quantities are available should demographics be used as 
proxies for them, and then only with the understanding that the results will 
be crude and ungeneralizable. 
2. There are no legitimate ordinary linear regression equations that ex- 
plain party ID across a national sample: Their coefficients are biased. In 
party ID equations, ordinary linear regression models apply only to groups 
of voters with the same level of political information and experience 
(Franklin and Jackson, 1983). 
This conclusion applies both to equation (5), in which party ID is ex- 
pressed as a function of parental PID plus the voter's experience with the 
parties, and also to the more statistically relevant equation (7), where PID 
is a function of one-period lagged PID plus the benefits of the most recent 
period. A glance at the latter equation will show why the proposition holds. 
Party ID is expressed as a ratio. So long as the denominator varies over 
observations, the regression is not linear. But the denominator is a fimction 
of two kinds of information: socialization from parents and political experi- 
ence. Only if both kinds of knowledge are equal across the population un- 
der study will the denominator be fixed. And unless it is fixed, it cannot be 
absorbed into the coefficients in the numerator to make the expression 
linear. 
The nonlinearity of the party identification equation in general samples is 
not merely a technicality safely ignored in praetiee, nor is it a flukish conse- 
quence of one arbitrary model. Instead, it expresses a fundamental and 
well-known fact about human beings in general and voters in particular that 
no theoretically serious model of PID will escape: The experienced are 
different from the inexperienced. While only recent history is vivid to the 
young, the crises of a generation ago remain present to the old, and they 
see current events in longer perspective. The use of ordinary linear regres- 
sion to explain party identification denies this difference, and it is biased 
for precisely that reason. 11 
3. There is no theoretically meaningful equation of any form that relates 
party ID to parental PID plus current issues. This proposition simply re- 
states equation (5): A voter's current PID begins with her parents and then 
is affected by her entire life's experience, not just her current situation. 
Again, the point is not technical but substantive. No sensible model will 
want to specify that a lower-middle-class voter with Democratic parents 
and moderate views who was out of work during the Depression, or fought 
in World War II, or attended previously all-white schools under court or- 
der, or lost an arm in Vietnam will respond to contemporary politics in just 
the same way as a similarly situated voter who lacks those experiences. Yet 
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the researcher assumes just that when ordinary linear regression is used to 
predict party ID from parental PID and current issue positions. Such re- 
gressions are hopelessly biased. 1~ Only ff the history of the voter's experi- 
ence with the parties is controlled do meaningful (nonlinear) specifications 
emerge. 
4. Controlled for PID at the prior period plus retrospective evaluations, 
the effect of  parental PID on current PID is exactly zero. This statement 
repeats equation (7). If lagged PID and current benefit levels (issue posi- 
tions) are already in an equation for PID, parental PID does not belong 
there. The intuition is transparent and largely independent of this model's 
particulars. Parental PID starts tile voter out as a Democrat or a Republi- 
can. But then tile voter is on her own. If she begins as mildly Democratic 
because her parents were, she does not grow continually ever more Demo- 
cratic from her twenties on into old age due to having Democrats for fore- 
bears. Parental influence is embodied in party ID, not continually added to 
it. 
To assume the contrary, as so many empirical studies do, is to imagine 
that initial parental socialization is supplemented throughout life by addi- 
tional powerful impacts like those of childhood. Typically, the equation is 
applied to the entire population, including those 60 years of age and older, 
whose parents are often deceased. How, then, are the postulated socializa- 
tion effects to continue? The implicit parent-child relationship seems to be 
Norman and his mother at the Bates Motel. ~'~ 
5. Party identification recorded during a political campaign incorporates 
both retrospective and current issue components; its coefficient is biased 
upward. The "current PID" from election surveys is usually recorded im- 
mediately prior to an election. This PID is not the gi,, referred to in the 
propositions above, but something else. It has already been noted that the 
use of party identification taken from the middle of the campaign incorpo- 
rates retrospective evaluations. However, campaign information may also 
be used to temporarily update PID. Thus, there should be movement in 
party ID during a campaign if the value of information is unexpected 
(Brody and Rothenberg, 1988). The result is an overestimate of the et~et of 
party identification. 
Odd as it may sound, a better estimate of the effect of current party 
identification might be had by substituting a lagged value of PID, perhaps 
one recorded during an earlier quiet local election, as in the Butler-Stokes 
British election study (1969). As one would expect from theoretical consid- 
erations, the latter measure shows none of the spurious contamination by 
the vote that afflicts the measure taken in the midst of the 1964 campaign. 
Combined with retrospective evaluations and current issue positions, and 
estimated with due regard for nonlinearity, the result would be a more 
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honest estimate of the impact of party identification in the sense political 
scientists usually have in mind, that is, an estimate shorn of effects due to 
incumbent evaluation and campaign issues, 
C O N C L U S I O N  
This paper has argued that voting research has outgrown the linear-in- 
variables regression model. A simple formal model of how voters learn im- 
plies a quite different statistical formulation. Moreover, in this new frame- 
work, demographic variables do not appear. They may be useful in various 
econometric procedures as instrumental variables--to be used and then 
ignored--but  they have no proper theoretical interpretation. For purposes 
of genuine understanding, they are irrelevant. 
These conclusions were derived from one particular model of voter be- 
havior, and in one sense, they are specific to it. But there is no cheap 
escape from the general point: Rigorous theorizing is needed. We need to 
know not that education matters but rather what it is about education that 
makes the voter choose differently. Demographics are clues, not hypoth- 
eses. No model of the voter's decision process from any theoretical per- 
spective is likely to bring us back to linear regression with demographics. 
Carrying out the implied program for public opinion research will not be 
easy. First, no one theory commands assent, and even if one were avail- 
able, we are all trained to do something else. For most readers, perhaps, 
all the dreary' rigor will seem unnecessary. 
The new program will also seem unattractive because it will make the 
work harder, particularly empirical analysis. When theoretical concepts are 
no longer treated as equivalent to our measurements, all statistical pro- 
cedures become more sensitive. Contrary to widespread belief, random 
measurement error in multiple regression can either raise or lower coeffi- 
cients. There is no general tendency for error to attenuate coefficients. In 
certain circumstanees~ otherwise-random errors correlated among them- 
selves can produce statistically significant and highly inflated coefficients of 
the wrong sign (Achen, 1983, 1985). Worse yet, relatively little economet- 
ric analysis has been carried out for measurement error of any sort in non- 
linear equations. Methodological spadework is needed. 
The promise, however, is great. At present, voting research is awash in 
disconnected empirical generalizations. Progress is very nearly halted. Too 
often, all coefficients seem to be significant because our models are bad and 
our measures are noisy: Every demographic variable we can measure has a 
little pseudoexplanatory power. 
tn such circumstances, even crude models are invaluable. They force 
attention to clearly specified causal processes. They eliminate variables, 
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pick a specification, instruct the researcher in estimation, and in general, 
constrict the latitudinarian lifestyle that has debilitated voting research thus 
far. Accepting that regimen is the first step toward vigorous intellectual 
health for voting studies. 
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NOTES 
1. Technically, "linear in variables" means that each independent variable enters an additive 
regression equation once, untransformed and with its own regression coeffieient--"ordi- 
nary" linear regression. In practice, of course, variables are sometimes logged or other- 
wise transformed to create mildly nonlinear effects. However, Ragin's argument is that 
this is insufficient. Hence the substantively interesting interactions and nonmonotonic 
effects that are cornmonplaee in verbal social science literature rarely appear in "large N" 
work. 
2. Note that this condition implicitly assumes that, on average, the parties are equally attrac- 
tive to the population. Typically, they are not: In that case, rescale 81 by subtracting the 
population average. 
3. The error term in equation (1) is white noise; generalizations are quite possible but are 
less transparent than this version. 
4. The weights are hio and hii, which correspond to socialization and information, respec- 
tively. The first measures strength (not direction) of parental socialization, that is, how 
much in~brmation was conveyed by parents about party differentials. The second ex- 
presses the variability experienced by the voter in party benefits over time: the sum of 
true variability and her errors of estimate (w, 2, which equals n/hil). 
5. The implication is that credible estimates of parental eflects on PID are elusive. Certainly 
they cannot be summarized by a single number: for example, the percent of American 
parents who transmit their PID to their children. No such number exists. For if both 
parent and child have fluid PIDs over time, what could it mean to say that the child has 
inherited a PID from the parent? 
6. Intercepts may be 'added in practice to deal with omitted variables. The form of the 
equation is that of (I2) below. 
7. For n, one might substitute a linear function of it, such as number of years in the political 
system or, if everyone enters at the same age, then age itself as in Franklin and Jackson 
(1983). 
8. The extra variance derives frmn the attempt to forecast the benefits of the next period 
rather than their mean. 
9. Franklin and Jackson find diminishing etteets of current benefits only for those elections 
since the National Election Studies began asking voters about parties' issue positions. For 
prior surveys, in which voter perceptions must be inferred from other questions, they 
find insignificant effects (of the wrong sign). 
10. For definitions of "intraperiod benefit levels" and "partisans," along with further discus- 
sion, see Achen (1989). Note that the causal mechanism is different than in Converse: The 
act of voting itself has no effect here, which seems to accord with empirical findings 
(Franklin and Jackson, 1983). 
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11. It should be obvious that the disease is not cured by adding variables for age or experi- 
enee to the regression equation. 
12. The same remark applies to equations in which the change from parental PID is regressed 
on current issue positions. 
13. Of eourse, when noisy survey measures are used, parental party ID will have a significant 
coefficient when PID is regressed on it, even with lagged PID, retrospeetive evaluations, 
and issues controlled. But that is no refutation of the Bayesian model. The speeifieation 
errors combine with the measurement errors to give weight to every variable, particularly 
sinee voters interpret questions about their PID in different ways (Flanigan, l%hn, and 
Zingale, 1989). In these cireumstanees, parental PID will proxy for many errors of omis- 
sion and measurement,  and the results will be useless. A serious test of the Bayesian 
model (e.g., eredibly assessing whether  a coeffieient in a vote or party ID equation is 
truly zero) demands correetion for measurement error. That correction will be difficult. 
